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Rafael Reuveny 
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In recent decades, the number of countries with ongoing civil wars and the share of these countries 
in the international system have increased dramatically. At the same time, the scope of economic 
globalization has also increased. Are these trends related? The theoretical literature on the determi- 
nants of civil wars presents conflicting views about the effects of globalization on such wars. One 
view expects economic globalization to reduce the likelihood of civil wars, ceteris paribus. A second 
view expects the opposite. A third view implies that globalization does not necessarily affect the like- 
lihood of civil war. Progress in assessing the validity of these arguments requires confronting them 
with data. However, so far economic globalization has been included as a control variable in a very 
small number of studies, and only trade was inspected. This paper statistically investigates the effect 
of several aspects of globalization on civil war from a large-N, time-series, cross-sectional sample. 
The occurrence of civil war is measured in two ways: the presence of civil war (or civil war preva- 
lence) and the breakdown of civil war (or civil war onset). Economic globalization is measured by 
the flows of trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and Internet use. We find that eco- 
nomic forms of globalization reduce the likelihood of civil war, but that Internet use does not affect 
its likelihood. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications of these findings for public 
policy and for future research. 
In recent years, many governments and international institutions have adopted 
policies designed to increase national integration into the global economy. People 
have reacted with great passion to these policies, at times violently. Whether or 
not one supports it, most would agree that the scope of economic globalization 
has expanded in recent decades. At the same time, the number of countries with 
ongoing civil wars and the proportion of these states in the system have increased. 
Are these two developments related? The civil war literature presents competing 
theoretical expectations about the effects of globalization on civil wars. One set 
of theories expects globalization to reduce the likelihood of civil wars. A second 
set expects the opposite. A third view implies that globalization should have a 
negligible effect on civil wars. 
This paper addresses the question of whether states that are more integrated 
into the global economy are less likely than others to face civil war. This ques- 
tion has important policy implications, since globalization is expected to con- 
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tinue and grow. Thus far, alternative views about the effect of globalization on 
civil war have been subject to almost no large-N empirical investigations. We 
seek to contribute to the literature by investigating hypotheses on some of the 
covariates of civil war within the context of the debate over globalization. 
In our analysis, the unit of analysis is the country-year. The dependent vari- 
able, civil war, is measured in two ways: its presence and onset. Globalization is 
measured from international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign port- 
folio investment (FPI), and Internet use. These forces are considered along with 
other variables the literature identifies as potential determinants of civil war. The 
analysis includes countries with available data for the period 1970-99. Our results 
reveal that states that are more open to the flow of trade, FDI, and FPI are less 
likely to experience civil war. Internet use, in general, does not affect the likeli- 
hood of civil war. 
In the next section, we discuss conflicting theories on why and how global- 
ization affects civil war. Next, we present our research design. This is followed 
by a discussion of our findings. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
our results for policymaking and future research. 
Theories of Economic Globalization and Civil War 
The effect of economic globalization on civil war has recently become a subject 
of theoretical debate. In one set of theories, globalization promotes peace. In a 
second set, it promotes civil war. A third view implies that globalization may not 
affect civil war. 
Globalization Reduces the Risk of Civil War 
Globalization is said to reduce the risk of civil war through seven channels. 
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT. eoclassical economics argues that free markets 
promote economic development. Globalization simply entails the global spread 
of free markets. Openness to trade, FDI, and FPI enables allocation of produc- 
tion factors to their most efficient uses, promoting development, which strength- 
ens the government, providing it with more revenues as the tax base is larger. 
Richer states, in turn, can have stronger police and military, deterring potential 
rebels. Richer countries also can have better infrastructure and administrative 
capacity, strengthening central control. In addition, richer people should have 
fewer grievances toward governments than poor and should be less likely to 
revolt. Lastly, civil wars entail opportunity costs that should be higher for rich 
states (e.g., income that rebels could earn in the labor force, fighting expenses 
that could be utilized for growth). Development, therefore, should deter rebel- 
lions, thus promoting peace (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Mason 2003; World Bank 
2002, 2003). 
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REDUCING INCOME INEQUALITY. Trade, FDI, and FPI are said to reduce income 
inequality in several ways (Held et al. 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003; World Bank 
2000, 2002). According to neoclassical economics, trade benefits owners of abun- 
dant factors of production and harms owners of scarce factors. Lesser developed 
countries (LDCs) are relatively more endowed with labor, while developed coun- 
tries (DCs) are relatively more endowed with capital. Thus, trade will reduce the 
earnings of capital and raise the earnings of labor in LDCs, promoting equality.' 
Trade also raises productivity since it promotes competition and since workers 
that earn more acquire more education. The competition reduces prices and 
diminishes monopolies, benefiting the poor. FDI inflows transfer capital, tech- 
nology, and management skills, promoting growth and reducing inequality. FPI 
inflows allow nations to invest and consume more, promoting growth and reduc- 
ing poverty. Regimes become more efficient to attract investments, because 
markets penalize bad economic performance. More efficient public policy 
reduces inequality by improving tax and welfare systems. Income equality will 
promote peace since it reduces the grievances that incite poor people to rebel.2 
REDUCING STATE CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY. States with open economies 
are less able to affect domestic economic performance, since they have limited 
control over external forces. For example, seeking higher profits, traders may 
move their businesses, investors and multinational corporations (MNCs) may 
leave, and currency traders may dump the local currency. Government's reduced 
ability to extract revenues from business should promote intrastate peace, since 
it makes the state less of a prize for rebels. That is, under globalization the 
benefits from taking over the state seem smaller than the costs of a rebellion 
(Goodwin 2001; Snyder 1999). 
INCREASING COMMUNICATION A D INFORMATION FLOWS. International business 
requires communication and information flows. Once these channels are open 
they also provide information on domestic politics, increase international con- 
tacts, and transmit foreign pressures on governments and rebels to resolve con- 
flicts peacefully. Open information and communication channels enable 
international organizations and governments to expand their activities overseas, 
mediate potential civil wars before they erupt, and resolve existing wars. The 
channels should also facilitate the spread of democratic norms respecting peace- 
ful conflict resolution (Goodwin 2001; Mason 2003. On international organiza- 
tions, see also Russett and Oneal 2001). 
REDUCING EXPORT OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS. Dependence on exports of primary 
goods is said to promote civil war through several channels discussed shortly. 
1The opposite is expected to occur in the DCs, promoting inequality. However, governmental insti- 
tutions in DCs are generally able to ameliorate this effect by transferring income from capital owners 
to labor in various ways (e.g., progressive taxation, employment benefits). 
2 On the role of inequality in promoting intrastate conflict, see the next subsection. 
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Economic globalization is expected to promote intrastate peace since it reduces 
this dependence. Trade, FDI, and FPI bring technology and knowledge to a 
country, promoting industrialization. Countries dependent on exports of primary 
goods such as timber, oil, and diamonds can reduce their dependency, diversify- 
ing their income sources (The Economist 2003; Mason 2003; World Bank 2003). 
INCREASING THE SIZE OF SECURITY FORCES. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
limit government spending on protectionism. However, FTAs do not restrict mil- 
itary spending. Governments signing FTAs may increase military spending to 
create jobs or promote growth. The result is larger and stronger security forces. 
In addition, economic openness creates winners and losers. The losers may chal- 
lenge the state to remedy their grievances. Seeking to squash dissent in order to 
promote trade and attract foreign business, the state employs more security forces. 
This reinforces state power and reduces the risk of civil war (IPN 2003; Martin 
and Schumann 1998). 
GENERATING ECONOMIC BENEFITS. Trade, FDI, and FPI benefit countries, while 
conflict is likely to harm these activities. The potential loss of economic benefits 
due to conflict is said to moderate a government's conflictive responses, promot- 
ing international peace (Polachek 1980; Russett and Oneal 2001). Similarly, civil 
war should lead to reduced trade and reduced foreign investments. Economic 
openness is expected to reduce intrastate violence, as actors seek to avoid these 
losses. A strong state response to rebels, for example, might temporarily stop a 
rebellion, but could lead to further unrest as the rebels regroup, raising losses 
from forfeited international business. Thus, states and rebels should have greater 
incentive to accommodate each other peacefully and public support for rebels 
should be smaller in open, rather than closed, economies (Mason 2003; Wager 
and Shulz 1995). 
Globalization Raises the Risk of Civil War 
Globalization is said to raise the likelihood of civil war through several 
channels. 
PROMOTING UNDERDEVELOPMENT. According to dependency theory, trade and 
foreign investment harm LDCs. The world economy consists of a developed core, 
which includes a few countries, and an underdeveloped periphery, which includes 
most other countries. The core is capital intensive. The periphery has a dual 
economy, including a small, relatively developed sector controlled by foreign 
interests and local elites who export labor-intensive goods to the core. The rest 
of the economy is underdeveloped. The core exports capital-intensive goods to 
the periphery. The core-periphery terms of trade harm the periphery. The periph- 
ery's development is distorted: industrialization is limited, and the masses remain 
poor. The setup is kept in place through explicit or implicit coalitions between 
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the elites in the core and the periphery (Amin 1990; dos Santos 1970; Rapley 
2002). Distorted development promotes dissent, since the masses in the periph- 
ery resent the status quo. The dissent is countered with state repression. A cycle 
of violence ensues, making rebellion and civil war more likely (Boswell and 
Dixon 1990, 1993; Russett, Starr, and Kinsella 2002). As order deteriorates, 
MNCs pressure host governments to defend their investments. If MNCs feel that 
the state does not serve their interests, they may hire private armies, fund rebels, 
or lobby their home state to support rebels. The resulting social chaos weakens 
the state and reduces its perceived legitimacy, raising the likelihood of civil war 
(Duffield 2000; Hawley 2000; Reno 2000; Winters 1999). 
RAISING INCOME INEQUALITY. Globalization is said to raise inequality in several 
ways. First, it favors elites at the expense of the masses, as dependency theory 
argues. Second, the argument that trade reduces inequality in LDCs assumes that 
markets are free, but rent seeking is prevalent in LDCs, labor is weaker than land 
and capital owners, and wages fall behind (IADB 1998; Rapley 2002; Robbins 
1996; Tullock 1980). Third, as LDCs open up to the world economy and begin 
to modernize, inequality rises since wages in more developed sectors are higher 
than those in other sectors (Nielson and Alderson 1995). Fourth, MNCs push 
local suppliers and governments to cut employment benefits and wages. Their 
threat to leave weakens labor's bargaining position. MNCs promote a dual 
economy and employ capital-intensive techniques that marginalize workers. They 
also evade paying local taxes, reducing state revenues and, therefore, welfare pro- 
grams, which hurts the masses more than the elites (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 
1985; Dixon and Boswell 1996; Firebaugh 1992; Held et al. 1999; Reuveny and 
Li 2003). Fifth, to attract foreign investment, states reduce public employment 
and privatize, raising unemployment and inequality. Sixth, financial openness is 
prone to crises due to volatile money movements across countries. In crises, the 
economy contracts, the tax base shrinks, welfare programs decline or cease, and 
many lose their jobs. The poor suffer more than the rich, and inequality rises 
(Germain 1997; Held et al. 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003; Strange 1996; UNDP 
1999). 
The link from inequality to civil war begins with a sense of deprivation when 
economic conditions differ from expectations. Deprived people feel that some 
groups succeed since they are favored unfairly by the government. The grievance 
provides fertile recruiting grounds for rebels who depict the regime as promot- 
ing the interests of some groups at the expense of others (Boswell and Dixon 
1990; Mason 2003; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Selbin 2001). 
REDUCING STATE CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY. State control of an open economy 
is harder than control of a closed economy. Foreign interests may override local 
needs. Investors may move money in and out of the country. Commodity prices 
may fluctuate in world markets. Facing these forces, the state is less able to com- 
pensate the losers from openness. Disputes over who should bear the costs of 
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adjustment may lead to calls for a retrenchment to liberalization. Sensing state 
weakness, the opposition may protest, strike, riot, and even rebel (Adams, Dev 
Gupta, and Mengisteab 1999; Hoogvelt 2001; IPN 2003; Martin and Schumann 
1998). Growing economic openness also typically involves deregulation of elec- 
tronic commerce and communications, which eases the ability of rebels and arms 
dealers to evade state control. Deregulation of transportation sectors, flags of con- 
venience, and offshore registration of companies make it harder for states to 
monitor freight traffic. Rebels are thus better able to acquire external supplies 
needed to wage war against the state (Berdal 2003; Duffield 2000; SAS 2001; 
Wood and Peleman 1999). 
INCREASING COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION FLOWS. The globalization- 
induced expansion of communication and information networks facilitates rebels' 
organizational activities. The media helps spread the rebels' cause, which assists 
in recruitment, fund raising, and mobilization of the masses. Cross border infor- 
mation flows raise expectations about ethnic sovereignty through demonstration. 
Electronic networks help finance rebels' activities, including acquiring arms. 
Market deregulation also may ease the creation of business alliances among 
rebels, warlords, foreign mercenaries, organized crime syndicates, and arms 
dealers. All of these activities assist the rebellion, increasing the likelihood of 
civil war (Berdal 2003; de Zeeuw and Frerks 2000; Mason 2003; United Nations 
2001). 
PROMOTING EXPORT OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS. International markets force LDCs 
to focus on their comparative advantage in producing primary goods, which raises 
the likelihood of civil war due to several forces. Leaders may amass personal 
wealth by siphoning off export earnings and ignoring society's needs. Corrupt 
leaders may share profits with support bases, angering other groups. Moreover, 
when primary products are found in a region dominated by one ethnic group, that 
group may wish to secede from the home country. The state is likely to react with 
force. Controlling primary goods also can provide rebels with funds to finance 
their activities. When the production and transport of primary resources are 
complex (e.g., oil), rebels can extort money from firms through kidnappings and 
threats to damage economic installations, unless ransoms are paid (Berdal 2003; 
The Economist 2003; Wood 2003; World Bank 2003). 
STIMULATING ALLIANCES BETWEEN REBELS AND ORGANIZED CRIME. Rebellions 
typically begin with a political goal. Over time, some rebellions acquire attrib- 
utes of criminal ventures, appropriating resources and wealth. As intrastate vio- 
lence centered on appropriation rises, the state becomes more oppressive. 
Globalization weakens state legitimacy, as it cannot shield people from external 
economic shocks. The combination of a weaker state and stronger rebel-organ- 
ized crime alliances raises the risk of attempts to take over the state (Duffield 
2000; The Economist 2003; FBI 2004; Kaldor and Luckham 2001). 
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GENERATING UNEQUAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS. One argument in the previous sub- 
section was that the fear of forfeiting the economic benefits of globalization pre- 
vents civil war. This logic assumes implicitly that all groups benefit equally from 
economic openness and are, therefore, similarly motivated to refrain from vio- 
lence. In international relations, some studies reason that since two states do not 
necessarily equally share the gains from economic interaction, globalization may 
not promote peace, and may even promote conflict (see Barbieri 2002 for review). 
Similarly, the gains and losses from globalization are distributed unequally 
among domestic actors. While neoclassical economics envisions the benefits of 
openness outweighing its costs, stylized observations suggest that winners typi- 
cally do not compensate the losers unless compelled to do so by the government. 
When compensation is imperfect, the gap between winners and losers widens. 
Consequently, it is possible to argue that the fear of economic losses may not 
deter the losers of globalization. 
Globalization Does Not Affect the Likelihood of Civil War 
The argument that globalization has no effect on civil war is not explicit in the 
literature, but rather follows from studies arguing that economic globalization is 
not an important force for most countries. These arguments can be categorized 
into three groups. One group argues that the alleged extent of globalization is 
exaggerated, particularly for LDCs. A second group disputes the claim that the 
state is powerless relative to foreign economic forces or is unable to compensate 
losers. A third group argues that the effects of globalization vary across coun- 
tries, depending upon the identity of losers and winners, and the nature of the 
local institutions.3 
Implications and Previous Empirical Treatments 
It is clear that the literature has conflicting expectations about the effect of 
globalization on civil war. All the views discussed above present face validity. 
Based on theoretical arguments alone, it is not possible to decide which of these 
sets of theories is most accurate. The expectations, therefore, need to be evalu- 
ated empirically. As it happens, the issue has not received much empirical-sta- 
tistical attention so far. When the role of economic openness in civil war has been 
examined empirically, it has been treated as one of many control variables. To 
our knowledge, only two studies estimate the effect of globalization on civil war 
and they focus only on trade. Esty et al. (1998) report that trade reduces the like- 
lihood of civil war onset, while Fearon and Laitin (2003) report that trade does 
not affect civil war onset. Clearly, there is room for additional empirical analy- 
sis of the effect of globalization on civil war. 
3For group 1, see Hirst (1997), group 2, see Garrett (1998), group 3, see Longworth (1998). 
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Research Design 
In designing our statistical analysis, we consider several issues. First, what con- 
stitutes a civil war? We use the list of wars compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
in their well-received study. It includes all the intrastate conflicts during the period 
1945-99 that meet four criteria: (1) the conflict involved fighting between a state 
and a nonstate group who seeks to take control in a region, seeks to topple the 
government, or use violence in order to achieve some goal; (2) the conflict killed 
at least 1,000 people overall, from either side; (3) the conflict killed at least 100 
people per year on average, from either side; and (4) the conflict killed at least 
100 people on each side of the fight. 
Second, two variables are employed in the literature to measure civil war. Many 
studies focus on the onset of civil war, which is set to 1 in the first year of a war 
and 0 otherwise (e.g., Esty et al. 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Other studies 
focus on the presence (also termed prevalence or incidence) of civil war, which 
is set to 1 during each year of a war and 0 otherwise (e.g., Elbadawi and Sam- 
banis 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002). In our context, focusing on the onset of civil 
war suggests an implied assumption that globalization only enters actors' deci- 
sions about starting civil wars. Examining the presence of civil war suggests that 
actors consider the role of globalization in each year of the war. Both the pres- 
ence and onset of civil war are important measures, and each will be considered 
here. 
Third, as a multidimensional concept, we need to measure economic global- 
ization with several indicators. At the state level, economic globalization implies 
openness to the world economy and its associated communication and informa- 
tion flows. We will employ indicators of trade, FDI, FPI, and Internet use. While 
other forms of communication and information flows seem relevant, they are not 
used here, as will be discussed shortly. 
Fourth, since all nations are affected by economic globalization, we include 
all states for which data are available. The unit of analysis is the state-year. 
The number of states per year varies over time due to missing data and 
changes in the international system, ranging from 121 to 156. This variation 
is typical of large-N, pooled designs. The sample covers the period 1970-99; 
the start date was dictated by the availability of globalization data, while the 
end date coincided with the end of the civil war data. The pooled design 
enables assessment of the effect of globalization on civil war across nations and 
over time. 
Fifth, in our 1970-99 period, almost all civil wars occurred in the LDCs, which 
also tend to be less globalized than the DCs. While globalization's influence on 
civil war may not be related to development, there may be differential effects of 
globalization in LDCs than in other states. To assess this possibility, we first inves- 
tigate the effects of globalization for all countries and then focus exclusively on 
the LDCs, as measured by nonmembership in the Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD). 
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Sixth, control variables need to be added to ensure that our results are not spu- 
rious. Recently, civil war scholars have used several common control variables, 
which we also employ here, including income per capita, population, democracy, 
political stability, ethno-religious structures, and natural resource exports (see, 
e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). To these, we add 
geographical attributes and temporal dependence variables. 
Seventh, civil war and some of our right hand side variables may affect each 
other. For example, democracy may affect civil war, but civil war may also be 
affected by conflict, an argument that goes back to Tocqueville. Trade and invest- 
ment may affect civil war, but war may also affect trade and investment. Some 
firms will avoid states with civil strife, while others may seek to meet the demand 
of warring parties (e.g., Barbieri and Levy 1999; Pollins 1989). Similar argu- 
ments apply to per capita income and population. While one cannot model all the 
possible interactions, one should not ignore the risk posed by simultaneity bias. 
One way to address this issue is by lagging the right-hand-side variables (e.g., Li 
and Reuveny 2003; Muller and Seligson 1994; Oneal and Russett 1999). While 
this is an imperfect solution, we adopt it. 
Eighth, we study some of the covariates of civil war in the context of the glob- 
alization discourse. We have discussed two sets of theories. One set argues that 
globalization raises the risk of civil war; a second set argues the opposite. Given 
their assumptions, we cannot reject these sets of theories on theoretical grounds. 
Each of these sets expects a certain sign for the effect of globalization on civil 
war. We test each sign against the null hypothesis that globalization has no effect 
on civil war, by employing a one-tail test in reporting the results (for studies 
taking a similar approach see, e.g., Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares (1998), Li and 
Reuveny (2003), Oneal and Russett (1999), and Reuveny and Li (2003)). 
Finally, pooled designs such as ours may exhibit temporal dependence from 
the predominance of peace. Ignoring this issue can lead to a missing variable bias 
and serial correlation. With serial correlation, estimated coefficients are unbiased, 
but their standard errors are biased. We employ Beck, Katz, and Tucker's (1998) 
method to model the temporal dependence.4 We also confront the possibilities of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (whether or not temporal dependence is 
present). With heteroskedasticity, the estimated coefficients also are not biased, 
but their standard errors are. We deal with these risks by using White's (1980) 
estimator, to which we add the option of clustering over countries, generating 
consistent and robust standard errors under general conditions of serial correla- 
tion, and heteroskedasticity (Wiggins 1999). 
The dependent variable, civil war, is measured in two ways. War is coded 1 
when a country has a civil war in a given year and 0 otherwise. Onset is coded 
1 the year a civil war begins and 0 otherwise. Data for both variables come from 
Fearon and Laitin (2003). Their sample includes 127 civil wars during the period 
1945-99, while ours includes 74 wars during the period 1970-99. 
4 The technique employs a counter of years of peace and three cubic spline terms. 
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Globalization is measured from the yearly levels of trade, FDI, FPI, and Inter- 
net use. The data for all these variables come from the World Bank (2004). Trade 
is equal to the sum of a state's total imports plus exports, divided by its GDP, per 
year. FDI involve two activities of firms in countries other than their own: cre- 
ation of subsidiaries and purchasing of at least 10% of the voting stocks of foreign 
firms (giving the buyer management power). It is given by the sum of the net 
inflow of FDI into a country (inflow minus outflow) divided by GDP. FPI denotes 
the ratio between the net inflow of portfolio investment (inflow minus outflow) 
and GDP. It measures private transactions in stocks and bonds. Internet measures 
the number of Internet users per 1000 people in a country. These data are not 
available prior to 1990. We believe it is safe to assume that Internet use was vir- 
tually zero prior to 1990.5 While it would be useful to include measures of other 
forms of communication and information flows, measures of radio, television, 
phone, and newspaper use are all highly correlated with GDP per capita, another 
variable employed, and with each other (r < .85). Internet does not pose this 
problem of collinearity. To the extent that GDP per capita serves as a proxy for 
these other variables, their effect on civil war can be said to be included in the 
model.6 
The data for the control variables, other than the temporal dependence meas- 
ures, come from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Beginning with GDP Per Capita, it 
is generally expected that increases in this variable will reduce the grievances that 
make civil war more likely. Richer states are also able to allocate more resources 
to security, which reduces the risk of attack by rebels. Oil State is coded as 1 if 
a country's fuel exports are greater than one third of its total export, and zero 
otherwise. Vast oil reserves may create grievances over the distribution of bene- 
fits, financial incentives for rebels to gain power, targets for extortion, and funds 
to finance war, all of which should increase the likelihood of civil war. 
Mountainous indicates the share of national areas that are mountainous. The 
assumption is that difficult terrains provide an advantage to rebels over govern- 
ment forces, raising the likelihood of civil war. Noncontiguous Territory is coded 
as 1 when national territories with at least 10,000 people are geographically sep- 
arated from the capital city and 0 otherwise. Noncontiguous territories are 
thought to aid rebel efforts, since they make it more difficult for governments to 
service and monitor people, raising the likelihood of civil war. 
Democracy measures the difference between the democratic and autocratic 
attributes of a state, reported in the Polity IV data set. On the one hand, demo- 
cratic states are believed to be more responsive to the people's demands and less 
5 See Interet Society at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history. Beginning in 1990, there are no states 
with missing data once they begin reporting Internet use, except Haiti in 1997. We code this point as 
missing. Using values from 1996, 1998, and their average did not change our result. 
6 Internet use may not be an ideal measure of the ability of international organizations and other 
states to manage internal conflicts within another country. That said, the Internet has become a 
medium of communication and data transfer for some organizations and governments, as well as a 
source of information on other countries, which can enhance conflict resolution activities. 
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likely to experience civil war. On the other hand, freedom creates opportunities 
of association and movement that would make rebellion easier. Some believe 
there is a curvilinear relationship (or an inverted U shape) between democracy 
and civil war. Political Instability is coded as 1 if the Polity IV regime scores 
changes at least three points during a three-year period, and 0 otherwise. Unsta- 
ble states may appear weak and become the target of attack, increasing the like- 
lihood of civil war. 
Population denotes the logged population size, per year. It is generally argued 
that it is more difficult to govern and meet the demands of large populations, 
which raises the risk of civil war. Ethnic Fractionalization measures national 
ethnic homogeneity. It is an index that gives the likelihood of two randomly drawn 
people in a country belonging to different ethno-linguistic groups. Religious 
Fractionalization is analogous to the measure of ethnic homogeneity, but it 
focuses on the degree of religious homogeneity in a country. Both these variables 
are generally expected to raise the likelihood of civil war.7 
Finally, Peace Years counts the number of years since the last civil war and is 
set to 0 during war. We also include three cubic spline variables. These controls 
for temporal dependence are generated by a program created by Tucker (1999). 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents results for civil war presence and Table 2 for civil war onset. 
In each Table, we first present the results for all the countries, and then for the 
LDCs. This is followed by a summary of related analyses reported in Appendix 
A.8 
In Table 1, Models 1-3 report the results for all the countries, and Models 4-5 
report the results for the LDCs. Model 1 includes all the variables described 
above, while Model 2 adds another variable related to temporal dependence. 
Model 3 excludes statistically insignificant variables. Model 4 applies Model 2 
to the LDCs, and Model 5 excludes the insignificant variables for LDCs. Across 
models, the results for the control variables generally agree with those reported 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003), which mirrors those reported in other studies. 
Hence, our primary investigation rests on a robust statistical platform. 
In Model 1, the effects of Trade, FDI and FPI on civil war presence (War) are 
negative and statistically significant. Hence, trade, FDI and FPI reduce the like- 
lihood of war. Recalling the definitions of these variables, our results imply that 
as Trade, FDI and FPI become more economically important to a country, the 
likelihood of civil war presence falls. Internet has no significant effect on War.9 
7We did not include Fearon and Laitin's "new state" variable, because there were no new states 
with complete data that experienced civil wars, making it a perfect predictor of peace. 8 The Appendix is available on the Journal of Politics website http://www.journalofpolitics.org/. 
9 One might assume that this results from Internet's high correlation with GDP Per Capita, but that 
is not the case (r = .36). Rather, it reflects the lack of variation in Internet prior to 1990. Our results 
do not change when we remove Internet from the model. 
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TABLE 1 
Globalization and Civil War Presence 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables All States Developing States 
Tradetl -.013** -.012* -.013** -.011* -.012* 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
FDI, -.063* -.075** -.067* -.078** -.070* 
(.048) (.047) (.047) (.045) (.047) 
FPI,I -.170*** -.164*** -.162*** -.163*** -.156*** 
(.047) (.046) (.043) (.057) (.054) 
Interett, .003 -.000 -.179* -.158* 
(.004) (.005) (.131) (.116) 
GDP per capitatl -.227*** -.227*** -.222*** -.386*** -.331*** 
(.078) (.077) (.066) (.121) (.112) 
Population,tl .179** .170* .186** .168* .180** 
(.110) (.109) (.106) (.113) (.103) 
Mountainous,tl .041 .047 .145* .125* 
(.098) (.100) (.096) (.097) 
Noncontiguous Territory,l 1.450*** 1.243*** 1.413*** 1.181*** 1.348*** 
(.438) (.462) (.413) (.541) (.466) 
Oil Statet,, .135 .178 .352 
(.421) (.404) (.381) 
Political Instability -.798* -.722* -.687* -.681* -.637* 
(.531) (.535) (.525) (.515) (.507) 
Democracyt,, .016 .013 .026 
(.041) (.041) (.041) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -.220 -.404 -.296 
(.459) (.481) (.422) 
Religious Fractionalization .176 .034 -.491 
(.647) (.636) (.696) 
War Count .053** .045** .039** .033* 
(.027) (.026) (.024) (.023) 
Peace Years -2.104*** -1.887*** -1.892*** -1.828*** -1.840*** 
(.248) (.275) (.283) (.260) (.269) 
Constant 1.852* 1.549 1.407 1.732* 1.274 
(1.392) (1.424) (1.334) (1.474) (1.392) 
N 2,361 2,361 2,364 1,892 1,895 
Log pseudo-likelihood -232.93 -230.51 -232.86 -221.66 -224.42 
Notes: White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
The cubic spline variables are included in the analyses, but not reported here. 
Turning to the control variables, the effect of GDP Per Capita is significant 
and negative, suggesting that we are less likely to see civil war in rich countries 
than in poor ones. We are also more likely to witness civil war in states with large, 
rather than small, populations, as given by the statistically significant and posi- 
tive coefficient for Population. 
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Mountainous is found to be unrelated to War, while Noncontiguous Territory 
has a statistically significant and positive effect on civil war. Hence, having sec- 
tions of the populations separated from central control raises the likelihood of 
civil war. Oil State lacks statistical significance, meaning that oil exporters are 
no more or less likely than others to experience a civil war. 
The effect of Political Instability on War is negative and significant. While this 
result may appear counterintuitive, recall that this variable indicates that the Polity 
regime score has changed in recent years. That change may mean the state has 
become more or less democratic; it may also mean the government has more or 
less support. Our finding implies that post-change states may be better supported, 
better able to fend off attacks, or better able to satisfy people and prevent griev- 
ances that produce civil wars. The effects of Democracy, Ethnic Fractionaliza- 
tion, and Religious Fractionalization on civil war are not statistically significant, 
which mirrors the findings of others. 
The coefficients of Peace Years and the three cubic spline variables (not 
reported here) are all statistically significant, indicating that temporal dependence 
is present in our sample. The negative coefficient for Peace Years tells us that 
states that enjoy a history of peace are less likely to experience civil war. 
The Peace Years counter treats all civil war years as equal. In other words, a 
one-year war is treated the same as a 30-year war; both receive zeros for Peace 
Years. However, we may need to differentiate short and long periods of war, just 
as we differentiate short and long periods of peace. War Count in Model 2 counts 
the number of years that civil war has lasted, beginning with a 1 in the year after 
the war outbreak. It is reset to zero once peace has lasted for more than one year.10 
We find that War Count has a statistically significant and positive effect on War. 
The longer the civil war, the more likely a state is to experience a civil war. Includ- 
ing this variable does not change any of our results. Hence, War Count should be 
included in the model. Model 3 excludes statistically insignificant control vari- 
ables from Model 2. Our results are unaltered. 
Models 4 and 5 focus on the LDCs. The effects of the control variables in this 
case are similar to those obtained for all the countries, except that the effect of 
Mountainous, which is positive before, is now statistically significant. The effects 
of Trade, FDI and FPI in Models 4 and 5 are virtually the same as those obtained 
for all countries. The effect of Internet use also is negative and statistically sig- 
nificant. Hence, economic openness and information flows reduce the likelihood 
of civil war presence for the LDCs. 
Table 2 focuses on civil war Onset. Model 1 employs the same variables as 
Model 1 in Table 1. Model 2 excludes the insignificant variables. Models 3 and 
4 focus on the LDCs." 
Beginning with the control variables, our findings in Table 2 are consistent with 
the results obtained by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The effects of GDP Per Capita, 
0 The war dates from Fearon and Laitin (2003) are used to construct this variable. 
n Model 1 in Table 1 is used and not Model 2, since War Count is not relevant to onset. 
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TABLE 2 
Globalization and Civil War Onset 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables All States Developing States 
Trade ,, 
FDIt_ 
FPI,1 
Internet,_ 
GDP per capita,_ 
Population1l 
Mountainous,_l 
Noncontiguous Territory,_ 
Oil State,, 
Political Instability 
Democracyt_l 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Religious Fractionalization 
Peace Years 
Constant 
N 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
-.003 
(.008) 
-.069* 
(.055) 
-.042 
(.080) 
-.001 
(.054) 
-.396*** 
(.162) 
.187** 
(.110) 
.252** 
(.121) 
.330 
(.521) 
.829** 
(.417) 
.440 
(.385) 
.021 
(.036) 
-.138 
(.697) 
.361 
(.909) 
.091 
(.188) 
-6.138*** 
(1.521) 
2,361 
-157.89 
-.003 
(.007) 
-.059 
(.054) 
-.049 
(.073) 
-.010 
(.064) 
-.371*** 
(.117) 
.200** 
(.094) 
.244** 
(.113) 
.791** 
(.387) 
-5.598*** 
(1.276) 
2,361 
-159.89 
-.003 
(.008) 
-.069 
(.056) 
-.044 
(.073) 
-.004 
(.068) 
-.333** 
(.198) 
.181** 
(.110) 
.248** 
(.120) 
.370 
(.530) 
.763** 
(.419) 
.447 
(.383) 
.019 
(.036) 
-.118 
(.706) 
.470 
(.918) 
.090 
(.186) 
-6.207*** 
(1.531) 
1,892 
-157.45 
-.003 
(.007) 
-.059 
(.055) 
-.050 
(.068) 
-.012 
(.074) 
-.328*** 
(.144) 
.198** 
(.094) 
.252** 
(.121) 
.739** 
(.391) 
-5.616*** 
(1.287) 
1,892 
-159.57 
Notes: White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
The cubic spline variables are included in the analyses, but not reported here. 
Population, Mountainous, Oil State are significant and have the same signs as 
found in their study. The variables they deem insignificant-Noncontiguous Ter- 
ritory, Democracy, Peace Years, the splines, and Ethnic and Religious Fraction- 
alization-are also insignificant here. The effect of Instability is positive, as in 
Fearon and Laitin's model, but is not significant, which is probably due to our 
smaller sample. 
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With the control variables behaving as expected, we turn to globalization. The 
results in Table 2 differ from those in Table 1. Globalization has negligible effects 
on the onset of civil war. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) find, Trade does not affect 
the likelihood of civil war Onset. Other aspects of globalization also have no 
effect. The exception is found for FDI, which has a significant negative effect in 
Model 1. Yet, that effect disappears under further scrutiny. Models 3 and 4 reveal 
that globalization does affect the likelihood of civil war Onset. 
The finding that globalization reduces the risk of civil war presence but does 
not affect the likelihood of civil war onset is intuitively appealing. The outbreak 
of civil war often reflects an intense state of emotions, anger, and a deep con- 
viction that goals can only be achieved through force. The opposing side is 
equally resolved to respond in kind. In this atmosphere, actors may fail to allo- 
cate sufficient weight to the consequence of war, including economic losses. As 
the war continues, however, business will be disrupted, foreign investors will flee, 
and trade will decline. Losses will mount on both sides. As Oneal and Russett 
(2003) remind us recently, most theories of war assume that actors are rational. 
This means that actors continue to evaluate their decisions to wage war as new 
information becomes available. Our results are consistent with the notion that 
people will find civil war less desirable when faced with mounting losses due to 
the adverse effects of civil war on a country's ties to the world economy. 
How large is the effect of globalization in reducing the risk of civil war pres- 
ence? To answer this question, we estimate how much the probability that a state 
will experience civil war would change if it moved from the average level of some 
attribute of globalization to one standard deviation above average, holding all 
other variables at their mean values. We find that states with high Trade are about 
28% less likely to experience War than those with average Trade; LDCs with high 
Trade are 29% less likely. States with high FDI are 14% less likely to experience 
War than those with average FDI (17% for LDC). High FPI reduces the likeli- 
hood of War by 29% (27% for LDCs) compared to the average level of FPI. For 
LDCs with high Internet, the likelihood of War is 52% less than with average 
Internet. 2 
Finally, we summarize related analyses discussed in Appendix A. First, we 
examine if the globalization results hold when a curvilinear relationship between 
Democracy and War is included in the model. We find that the results in Table 1 
still hold. Second, we examine if changes in globalization, rather than levels, 
affect War. We find no significant effect from changes in Trade or FDI. Positive 
changes in FPI reduce the likelihood of War for both samples. Positive changes 
in Internet reduce the likelihood of War only for the LDCs. Third, we combine 
the curvilinear democracy measure and the changes in globalization. We find no 
difference in results for the changes in globalization relative to the previous 
results as well as no significant curvilinear democracy effects. Fourth, we exclude 
12 We use Models 2 and 4 in Table 1 to perform these estimates (see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 
2003). 
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Peace Years and the splines from Models 2 and 4 in Table 1. Our findings for 
globalization do not change relative to Table 1, except that the negative effect of 
Internet is now significant. 
Conclusion 
The literature has presented conflicting theoretical views on the effect of glob- 
alization on civil war. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first 
attempt to assess statistically the debate from a large N sample. Globalization 
was measured from Trade, FDI, FPI, and Internet use. Civil war was measured 
as presence and onset. The analysis was conducted for all countries with avail- 
able data, and for the LDCs alone. We covered the period 1970-99. 
The results show that trade, FDI, and FPI reduce the likelihood of civil war 
presence for all states. Internet use reduces the likelihood of civil war presence 
only for the LDCs. Globalization does not affect the likelihood of civil war onset. 
These findings are found to be robust across different sensitivity analyses. Taken 
as a whole, our results suggest that actors initiating civil war do not consider 
globalization. However, they reassess their decisions about the civil war over 
time, as the losses that come with lost global ties mount. 
Our results have important policy implications. In recent decades, nearly all 
civil wars have taken place in the LDCs. These countries tend to be less open to 
the world economy. We find that economic openness reduces the likelihood that 
civil war will be present in LDCs, but not the likelihood of its onset. Policies that 
raise per capita income, reduce population size, and reduce dependence on oil 
exports are likely to be the most effective strategies to reduce the risk of civil war 
outbreak. Economic openness is nevertheless recommended since it reduces the 
likelihood of ongoing civil war. 
That said, efforts to integrate LDCs into the global economy must be done cau- 
tiously. All the arguments about the possible consequences of globalization for 
civil war have merits. While the pacifying forces of globalization are more appar- 
ent in our large N sample, it is still possible that globalization will worsen civil 
strife in individual cases, making civil war more likely. 
Our paper, like all studies, must be viewed as the start of a journey, not its end. 
Future research may extend this analysis. For example, it would be beneficial to 
expand the historical domain of the study. Our preliminary research suggests that 
this would be a difficult project involving a large data collection effort from indi- 
vidual country sources. 
Future research also may explore the reciprocal relationship between civil war 
and some of its determinants. So far, this issue has generally been handled by 
lagging the right hand side variables, as was done here. Estimating the recipro- 
cal relationship within our context is likely to be difficult. The simultaneity of 
globalization and civil war involves at least four continuous variables and one 
dichotomous variable. To our best knowledge, the estimation algorithms required 
for this analysis are not yet available. Madalla's (1983) method comes closest, 
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but his solution only works for models involving one dichotomous variable and 
one continuous variable. 
Finally, future research may study microlevel processes within the state to 
understand the linkages between globalization and civil war. For example, we 
might imagine that globalization creates or diffuses tensions over the distribution 
of benefits within society. This paper has employed a nation-year level of analy- 
sis, which is the norm in the statistical civil war literature. New insights might 
be gained from going deeper into the national box. 
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